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Abstract—We propose the new technique of physical-layer
cryptography based on using a massive MIMO channel as a
key between the sender and desired receiver, which need not
be secret. The goal is for low-complexity encoding and decoding
by the desired transmitter-receiver pair, whereas decoding by
an eavesdropper is hard in terms of prohibitive complexity. The
decoding complexity is analyzed by mapping the massive MIMO
system to a lattice. We show that the eavesdropper’s decoder
for the MIMO system with M-PAM modulation is equivalent to
solving standard lattice problems that are conjectured to be of
exponential complexity for both classical and quantum comput-
ers. Hence, under the widely-held conjecture that standard lattice
problems are hard to solve, the proposed encryption scheme has
a more robust notion of security than that of the most common
encryption methods used today such as RSA and Diffie-Hellman.
Additionally, we show that this scheme could be used to securely
communicate without a pre-shared secret and little computational
overhead. Thus, by exploiting the physical layer properties of
the radio channel, the massive MIMO system provides for low-
complexity encryption commensurate with the most sophisticated
forms of application-layer encryption that are currently known.
Index Terms—Cryptography, Lattices, MIMO, Quantum Com-
puting
I. INTRODUCTION
The decoding of massive MIMO systems forms a com-
plex computational problem. In this paper, we exploit this
complexity to form a notion of physical-layer cryptography.
The premise of physical-layer cryptography is to allow the
transmission of confidential messages over a wireless channel
in the presence of an eavesdropper. We present a model
where a given transmitter-receiver pair is able to efficiently
encode and decode messages, but an eavesdropper who has
a physically different channel must perform an exponential
number of operations in order to decode. This allows for
confidential messages to be exchanged without a shared key
or key agreement scheme. Rather, the encryption exploits
physical properties of the massive MIMO channel.
Our MIMO wiretap channel model for communication is
shown in Figure 1. Here, a parallel channel decomposition
allows for two users, Alice and Bob, to communicate with
an overhead of only performing linear precoding and receiver
shaping of their MIMO channel, assumed known to both of
them. To an eavesdropper, Eve, who has a different channel,
this decomposition does not aid in the ability to decode the
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Figure 1. A MIMO wiretap channel model, defined by a channel gain matrix
A = UΣVH , where A is known to both Alice and Bob. This allows Bob to
efficiently decode Alice’s message. If Eve is not physically co-located, then
knowledge of A, which we call the channel state information key, does not
aid her in decoding the message with low complexity. Through the use of
reductions we show that the complexity of Eve decoding Alice’s message to
Bob is at least as hard as standard lattice problems. Hence, this complexity
is conjectured to be exponentially hard in the number of transmitter antennas
Alice uses. In particular, no existing algorithms, including those of a quantum
computer, have been shown to solve such problems in sub-exponential time
channel with linear complexity. In particular, we prove that it
is exponentially hard1 for the eavesdropper to decode Alice’s
transmitted vector in our system model even if it knows the
channel between Alice and Bob. We refer to the channel
encryption key as a Channel State Information- or CSI-key.
The model requires both the transmitter and receiver to have
perfect knowledge of the channel, but this knowledge does not
need to be kept secret. For decoding by Eve to be hard, our
model requires a maximum on the SNR that Eve maintains and
that Alice and Bob use a large constellation size, where the
required constellation size is related to the number of transmit
antennas.
To characterize the hardness of decoding MIMO systems,
we use the method of reductions found in the computational
study of cryptography. A brief description of this method will
be provided below, while a more detailed overview of this
approach to cryptography can be found in [1]. In the method
of reductions, we suppose that we have access to an oracle,
i.e., a black box which, given a channel and a received vector,
returns the proper transmitted vector in a single operation. If
the existence of such an oracle would imply efficient solutions
(i.e., ones whose runtime is bounded to within a polynomial
factor of the length of the input) to problems which are
known (or conjectured) to be hard (i.e., ones whose runtime
is bounded to within an exponential factor of the length of
the input), then it follows that such an oracle cannot (or is
conjectured to not) exist.
We show in this work that under proper conditions, the
complexity of decoding MIMO systems by an eavesdropper
can be related to solving standard lattice problems. The con-
1More precisely, we prove that it is at least as hard as solving standard
lattice problems in the worst case, which are conjectured to be exponentially
hard.
2nection between MIMO and lattices is not new: for example,
see Damen et al. [2], where the maximum-likelihood decoder
is related to solving the Closest Vector Problem. Problems on
lattices have been widely studied in cryptography and other
fields and many standard lattice problems are conjectured to
be hard ([3]–[13]). Lattice problems are also conjectured to be
hard even when solved using quantum computers when they
exist ([3], [13]). Creating efficient cryptosystems that achieve
security given the presence of quantum computers is currently
an active area of research, since most cryptosystems today,
such as RSA (a public-key algorithm named after its inventors,
Rivest, Shimir, and Adleman, [14]) or the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange (see [15]), could efficiently be broken by a
quantum computer ([16]–[18]). Our physical-layer cryptosys-
tem provides quantum-resistant cryptography by exploiting the
hardness associated with the eavesdropper’s decoding in a
massive MIMO system.
The idea of exploiting properties of the physical layer to
achieve secrecy is not new and dates back to Shannon’s notion
of information theoretic secrecy [19] and Wyner’s wiretap
channel [20] (for a survey on the subject see [21]). In informa-
tion theoretic secrecy, the goal is to communicate in a manner
such that legitimate users may communicate at a positive rate,
while the mutual information between the eavesdropper and
the sender is negligibly small. Note that since in our model
Bob and Eve have statistically-identical channels, information
theoretic secrecy is not possible without a key rate, coding, or
using properties of Alice’s and/or Bob’s channel in the trans-
mission strategy. Along these lines, Shimizu et al. [22], have
suggested using properties of the radio propagation channel to
achieve information theoretic secrecy. These notions all differ
from ours as we consider encryption based on computational
complexity at the eavesdropper’s decoder rather than through
equivocation at the eavesdropper related to entropy and mutual
information. We believe this work makes significant progress
in addressing some of the challenges that have been identified
in applying physical layer security to existing and future
systems [23].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II outlines our system model and the underlying assumptions
upon which the security of our system is based. In Section
III we discuss lattices, lattice problems, and lattice-based
cryptography in order to provide the background for our main
result, which is stated in Section IV and proved in Appendix
A. In Section V we discuss additional notions of security for
our model, including how to achieve security under adversarial
models commonly considered by cryptographers.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. The Wiretap Model
Consider an n×m real-valued MIMO system consisting of
n transmit antennas and m receive antennas:
y = Ax+ e, (1)
where x ∈ Rn, and A ∈ Rn×m is the channel gain matrix.
Each entry of the channel gain matrix is drawn i.i.d. from the
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and standard deviation
k/
√
2π. This distribution is henceforth written Ψk. The vector
e ∈ Rm is the channel noise with each entry i.i.d. Ψα.
It is assumed that A is known to both the transmitter and
receiver. If we constrain the vector x to use a discrete,
periodic constellation, then the set of received points becomes
analogous to points on a lattice, perturbed by a Gaussian
random variable.
We assume that there are an arbitrary number of receive
antennas, restricted to an amount within a polynomial factor
of the number of transmit antennas, n. By making this
assumption, we are considering the advantage an eavesdropper
would gain by having an arbitrarily large number of receive
antennas, but we are assuming that building a receiver with
an exponential number of antennas relative to those at the
legitimate user’s transmitter would be prohibitively expensive.
Assuming that certain requirements on SNR and constellation
size are met, as described below, the security of the system
can be quantified solely by the number of transmit antennas.
This number plays the role of the security parameter com-
monly used by cryptographers in designing cryptosystems.
Essentially, we are saying that decoding the system requires
a number of operations that is exponential in n and we
parameterize the remaining variables in our system based on
n.
We consider real systems with the transmitted signal con-
stellation, X , defined as the set of integers [0,M). Lattices
can easily be scaled and shifted, so we use this constellation
without loss of generality over all possible M-PAM constella-
tions. Our analysis assumes channels with a zero-mean gain,
but this is for simplicity of exposition as the proof given in
Appendix A can easily be generalized to systems with non-
zero mean. We consider uncoded systems, but our results can
be extended to coded systems as we discuss in Section V.
Let the vector ai ∈ Rn denote the gains between the
transmitter and the ith receive antenna, let ei denote the noise
sample at this antenna, and let x represent the transmitted
vector which is drawn from Xn. The ith receive antenna gets
a noisy, random inner-product of the form
yi = 〈ai,x〉+ ei. (2)
Our work can easily be extended to complex channels,
where the real and imaginary portions of the channel gain
matrix and noise are drawn independently, and M-QAM
symbols are sent, using an equivalent constellation as in the
real case.
Our model considers static channels. However, our model
can easily be extended to time-varying channels: consider a
single message is transmitted t times, no more than once per
channel coherence period. Each transmission is equivalent to
Eve receiving the original message with t times as many re-
ceive antennas which does nothing to aid in the computational
complexity of her decoding.
Let user A have n transmit antennas which are used to send
a message to user B who has a number of receive antennas that
is within a polynomial factor of n. Let the channel between A
and B be represented by A, where each entry is i.i.d. Gaussian
Ψk. The noise at each receive antenna is drawn from ΨMα.
3The results in this paper show that MIMO decoding can be
related to solving standard lattice problems when a certain
minimum noise level and constellation size are met. If the
noise power is below the required level, efficient decoding
methods such as the zero-forcing decoder could be applied
to our system. In other words, if these conditions are not
met, then our results provide no insight on the complexity
of decoding, and hence on the security of the MIMO wiretap
channel. Specifically, for some arbitrary m > 0, we require
the following constraints on the transmission from user A to
user B:
Minimum Noise: mα/k2 >
√
n (3)
Constellation Size: M > m 2n log logn/ logn (4)
where the parameter m may be chosen by a user or system
designer in order to trade off the SNR requirement for the size
of the constellation.
Now consider an eavesdropper, EVE , which has poly(n)
receive antennas, and receives message x with channel rep-
resented by B, where each entry is again i.i.d. Ψk. Let the
channel have noise be drawn from ΨMβ , where β ≥ α. In
other words, the eavesdropper must meet at least the minimum
noise requirement stated above. Discussion on how to ensure
this requirement is met is also provided in Section V.
In order to send message x to user B, user A performs a
linear precoding as described in [25]. Let the singular value
decomposition of A be given as A = UΣVH . A now sends
x˜ = Vx. Upon receiving a transmission from user A, user B
computes y˜ = UHy. It is easy to show that this expands to
y˜ = Σx+ e˜. Since Σ, representing the singular values of A,
is a diagonal matrix, B can efficiently estimate x with linear
complexity in n. Notice that U is unitary so ‖e‖ = ‖e˜‖.
Now consider the message received by EVE :
y˜ = BVx+ e˜. (5)
Note that V consists of the right singular vectors of A,
which is independent of B and unitary. Gaussian random
matrices are orthogonally invariant [26], so since V is unitary,
multiplying by V returns the matrix to an identical, indepen-
dent distribution. In other words, the entries of BV are i.i.d.,
following the same distribution as B.
As the main result of this work, we will prove that the
computational complexity for EVE to efficiently recover x can
be mapped to the problem of solving standard lattice problems
which are conjectured to be computationally hard.
B. Definitions
The following definitions will be used in the proofs of our
results. We define a negligible amount in n, denoted negl. (n)
as any amount being asymptotically smaller than n−c for any
c > 0. Similarly a non-negligible amount is one that is at
least n−c for some c > 0. We define a polynomial amount,
denoted as poly(n), as an amount that is at most nc for some
c > 0. An expression is exponentially small in n when it
is at most 2−Ω(n), and exponentially close to 1 when it is
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Figure 2. A Gaussian distribution on a two-dimensional lattice
1 − 2−Ω(n). A probability is overwhelming if it holds with
probability 1−n−c for some c > 0. An algorithm is efficient or
efficiently computable if its run time is within some polynomial
factor of the parameter n. An algorithm is hard if its run time
is at least 2n. We assume that, as input, algorithms accept
real numbers approximated to within 2−nc for some c > 0.
Z represents the set of all integers and Zq represents the set
of integers modulo q. Given two probability density functions
φ1, φ2 on R
n
, we define the total variational distance as
∆(φ1, φ2) =
1
2
ˆ
Rn
|φ1(x) − φ2(x)| dx. (6)
C. MIMO Signal Distributions
In this subsection, we define various distributions that are
used in our problem. Specifically, we discuss distributions
of lattice points and distributions which can be empirically
related to received MIMO signals.
First, in the proof of our work, we will need to generate
lattice points according to a Gaussian distribution. Since a
lattice is a discrete set of points, we define a discrete Gaussian
distribution, DA,α, for any countable set A and parameter α
as
∀x ∈ A,DA,α(x) = Ψα(x)
Ψα(A)
. (7)
We now define the distribution, AM,α,k on Rn × R. The
distribution AM,α,k is the distribution of channel gains and
the received signal from a single antenna in a MIMO system
for a transmitted vector. This distribution is defined for a
single antenna so a MIMO system with m receive antennas
would get m samples from this distribution. This distribution
is the input to the MIMO decoding problem which we will
define in this section. For some arbitrary x ∈ Xn, we
define the distribution AM,α,k as the distribution on Rn × R
given by drawing a as defined above, choosing ei ∼ ΨMα
and outputting (ai, yi = 〈ai,x〉+ ei). We could alternatively
express our system as drawing ei ∼ Ψα and outputting
4(ai, yi = 〈ai,x〉 /M + ei), which would result in the same
received SNR.
D. The MIMO Decoding Problem
Given these distributions, we now precisely define MIMO
decoding for the eavesdropper in the MIMO wiretap channel,
which we denote as the MIMO-Search problem. The search
problem asks us to recover the transmitted vector x without
error. In Section V, we discuss how to use the hardness
of the problem to achieve cryptographically secure systems,
and provide a comparison between cryptographer’s notions of
security with information theoretic ones. In Appendix A, we
prove that the search problem is as hard as solving certain
lattice problems. We also use the term “MIMO decoding
problem” to refer to the search problem.
We wish to show that the MIMO decoding problem, defined
below, is hard to solve, i.e., that this decoding is of exponential
complexity in the number of transmit antennas. We say that an
algorithm solves this problem if it returns the correct answer
with a probability greater than 1− n−c, for some c > 0.
Problem Definition 1. MIMO− SearchM,α,k. Let M ≥ 2,
α ∈ (0, 1), k ∈ R, n > 0. Given a polynomial number of
samples of AM,α,k, output x.
The MIMO search problem above will be related to solving
standard lattice problems (discussed in Section III) through
standard reductions. In Section III and Appendix B we will
also discuss the complexity of solving these lattice problems.
The result of our reduction implies that the complexity of
decoding a MIMO system grows exponentially in the number
of transmit antennas, i.e., MIMO decoding is at least as
hard as the lattice problems to which we relate them. More
precisely, we state this in a contrapositive manner below. This
contrapositive statement allows us to conjecture a lower bound
on the complexity of solving the MIMO decoding problems,
based on the conjectured hardness of solving lattice problems.
Main Result. Let M > m 2n log logn/ log n for some m > 0,
α ∈ R, and k ∈ R be such that mα/k2 > √n. Given access
to an efficient algorithm that can solve MIMO− SearchM,α,k,
there exist efficient classical and quantum solutions to standard
lattice problems, which are conjectured to be hard.
We breifly introduce a second problem, the
MIMO-Decision problem. This problem asks whether
or not received samples are transmitted from a MIMO system
(with known channel gain matrix) or are generated from a
Gaussian distribution. Similar decision problems are common
in cryptography, for example, in [13], Regev shows that
the decision variant of the LWE problem is hard, and uses
this fact to achieve semantic security – effectively hiding
information in a random variable that is uniformly random.
Due to the exponential requirement on the constellation size
in our main result, a reduction from the MIMO-Decision
problem to the MIMO-Search problem is not apparent. It
is an open problem to show whether or not this problem is
hard, and if so, how the result could be used to construct a
secure cryptosystem.
Problem Definition 2. MIMO− DecisionM,α,k. Let M ≥ 2,
α ∈ (0, 1), k ∈ R, n > 0. Given a polynomial number of
samples, distinguish between samples of AM,α,k and samples
of ΨM(α+k)
E. Assumptions
In this work we offer a proof of security by showing that
breaking our cryptosystem is at least as hard as solving well-
known lattice problems in the worst case. These problems
are conjectured to require exponential running time. This
conjecture and the large body of research behind it is discussed
in the following section. For a more through treatment of the
hardness of these problems, see [3]–[12]. Our proof is also
based upon the following assumptions:
• We assume that the Gaussian channel noise has suf-
ficiently large power so that mα/k2 >
√
n. If the
noise is too small, it is possible that a subexponential
algorithm exists to recover the message (for motivation
of this belief consider the subexponential attack on the
LWE problem with low noise described by [27]). One
possible way to ensure this requirement is met is to add
noise at the transmitter. This intentionally degrades the
communication SNR for a trade-off of security. A further
discussion and characterization of our system in terms of
received SNR is found in Section V.
• We assume that the constellation size of the system
is large relative to the number of transmit antennas.
Specifically, in order for the proof of Theorem 1 to hold,
we require that M > m 2n log logn/ logn. Unlike the noise
requirement, it is unclear that sub-exponential decoding
immediately follows if this bound is not strictly met; it
is an open problem as to whether or not this requirement
is needed.
• We assume that each entry in the channel gain ma-
trix is independent and Gaussian. More importantly, we
assume that the two receivers of Bob and Eve, have
independent channels. The fact that channels between
different antennas are independent is well justified in
most scattering environments. For example, in a uniform
scattering environment, it has been shown that channels
are independent over a distance of 0.4λ, see e.g. [28] or
[29]. This independence analysis is extended to MIMO
channels in [30] and [31].
III. LATTICES
We now provide an overview of lattices and lattice-based
cryptography. This section contains all of the concepts used
in the cryptography literature that are required in the proof of
our main result. We first define several problems on lattices
that are all conjectured to be hard to solve and are all used
in the proof of our main result to show that MIMO decoding
is at least as hard as solving standard lattice problems. We
next provide a discussion on the complexity of solving these
lattice problems, followed by a discussion on the Learning
With Errors (LWE) problem. The Learning With Errors problem
has a striking similarity to the problem of MIMO decoding.
We follow a very similar approach to show the hardness of
5MIMO decoding as is used to show the hardness of LWE
decoding.
Lattice-based cryptography has generated much research
interest in recent years. Cryptographers’ interest in lattices
largely began with the surprising result of Ajtai [5] which
created a connection between the average-case and worst-
case complexity of lattice problems. Cryptographers have
used these results to create a wide variety of cryptographic
constructions which enjoy strong proofs of security. Important
to this paper is the work of Micciancio and Regev [34] which
explores Gaussian measures on lattices. The Learning With
Errors problem, first introduced by Regev [13], shows that
recovering a point that is perturbed by a small Gaussian
amount from a random integer lattice can be related to approx-
imating solutions to standard lattice problems. This problem is
discussed more thoroughly below. The hardness reduction in
this work very closely follows the work in [13]. For a survey
on lattice-based cryptography, see [3].
A lattice is a discrete periodic subgroup of Rn that is closed
under addition. Alternatively, a lattice can be defined as the set
of all integer combinations of n linearly independent vectors,
known as a basis,
L(A) =
{
Ax =
n∑
i=1
xiAi : x ∈ Zn
}
. (8)
A lattice is not defined by a unique set of basis vectors. Any
basis A multiplied by a unimodal matrix results in an alter-
native basis representation of the same lattice. We can define
a set of lengths, in the l2-sense, λi(A), for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, as
the radius of the smallest ball around the origin that contains i
linearly independent vectors. These lengths are known as the
successive minima. It is easy to show that there exists vector
‖vi‖ = λi(A) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and that λ1(A) ≥ mini ‖A˜i‖,
where A˜ is the Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization of the basis
A, where the norm is taken as the l2 norm.
The dual of a lattice L(A) ∈ Rn, L∗(A), is the lattice given
by all y ∈ Rn such that for every x ∈ L(A), 〈x,y〉 ∈ Z. Since
A is full rank, L((AT )−1) is the dual of the lattice L(A).
A. Lattice Problems.
This section considers a set of standard problems on lattices
that are conjectured to be computationally hard. These prob-
lems will be used in the characterization of the computational
complexity of MIMO decoding. These problems are defined
with an approximation factor, γ(n) ≥ 1, and input given
in the form of an arbitrary basis. The precise definition
of the approximation factor varies for each problem, but is
precisely stated in each definition below. The approximation
factor plays an important role in the computational complexity
required to solve a given problem. In general, for very large
approximation factors, the following lattice problems can be
efficiently computed. For small approximation factors, the
problems are conjectured to require exponential running time.
The problem of MIMO decoding will be related to solving
lattice problems with an approximation factor of γ = n/α,
which is conjectured to be hard. The relation between the ap-
proximation factor and the complexity of solving the problem
is discussed in detail in Appendix B. For a survey on the
hardness of these problems, see [3] or [4].
The first problem we describe is the shortest vector problem.
In general, these problems can be efficiently solved if γ is at
least O (2n), but are conjectured to require exponential run
time for exact solutions or even for polynomial approximation
factors. A close variant of this problem, the decision Shortest
Vector Problem (GapSVP), asks whether or not the shortest
vector generated by the lattice is shorter than some distance
d. In general, for an arbitrary basis, short vectors are hard to
find.
Definition 1. GapSVPγ is defined as follows: given an n-
dimensional lattice L(A) and a number d > 0, output YES if
λ1(A) ≤ d or NO if λ1(A) > γ(n) · d.
The following problem, the shortest independent vectors
problem (SIVP), is often referred to as a lattice basis reduction.
Definition 2. SIVPγ is defined as follows: given an n-
dimensional lattice L(A), output a set of n linearly indepen-
dent vectors of length at most γ(n) · λn(A).
One well-known algorithm for finding approximate solu-
tions to the SIVP problem is the Lentra-Lentra-Lovász (LLL)
lattice basis reduction algorithm, which creates an “LLL-
reduced” basis in polynomial time. For large values of n,
the LLL algorithm returns a basis that is exponentially larger
than the shortest possible basis of the lattice. It is generally
conjectured that no polynomial time algorithm could approx-
imate SIVP to within a polynomial factor of n. For a more
in-depth discussion of lattice basis reduction algorithms and
their complexity, see [3].
The following two lattice problems are important in the
reduction given in this paper. They are also used by Regev
in [13] in his proof of the security of LWE. The first problem,
the Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD) problem, is equivalent
to decoding a linear code, where the received vector is at most
some distance d from the nearest codeword. Exact solutions to
this problem are conjectured to require exponential run time.
By requiring d < λ1/2, we ensure that the closest vector
is unique. The Closest Vector Problem (CVP) is identical to
this problem but without a bounding distance. The closest
vector problem arrises in many other contexts, for example it
is equivalent to decoding a linear code, and also the maximum-
likelihood decoding problem in MIMO systems.
Definition 3. The BDDL(A),d problem is defined as follows:
given an n-dimensional lattice L(A), a distance 0 < d <
λ1(A)/2, and a point x ∈ Rn which is at most distance d
from a point in L(A), output the unique closest vector in
L(A)
Informally, we can relate MIMO decoding to BDD (or more
generally to the Closest Vector Problem), as follows. Linear
precoding is well known to simplify encoding and decoding
of a MIMO system to be of polynomial complexity in n. In
terms of lattice problems, we say that this linear precoding
transforms the lattice basis into one in which the Closest
Vector Problem is easy to solve. This is very closely related to
the cryptographic notion of the trapdoor function: a function
6that is easy to compute in one direction, but computationally
infeasible to invert without a key (which serves as the “trap-
door”) [15]. The linear precoding transformation applied to the
MIMO channel effectively creates a spatially-varying trapdoor
in that it allows the MIMO channel to be efficiently inverted
only at Bob’s location. In our model, both communicators
must have knowledge of the channel in order to perform
the parallel decomposition via a singular value decomposition
(SVD) associated with linear precoding. The eavesdropper
may also learn this channel and hence learn the “key”, but this
does not allow it to decode the message with lower complexity.
We finally define the discrete Gaussian sampling problem
(DGS), which, for small values of r, can be reduced to solving
GapSVP and SIVP. See [13] for this reduction. This problem
asks us to sample a Gaussian distribution, with standard
deviation r/
√
2π, with support over a lattice.
Definition 4. The DGSr problem is defined as follows: given an
n-dimensional lattice L(A) and a number r, output a sample
from DL,r, the discrete distribution defined in Section II.3.
We borrow the following claim from [33], which gives
an efficient algorithm to solve DGSr for large r. Intuitively,
solving DGSr for small values of r becomes a computationally
harder task because it reveals information about the short
vectors in the lattice. We use the following claim in the proof
of our main theorem, as our main theorem requires sampling
Gaussian distributions on lattices.
Claim 1. [33, Theorem 4.1]. There exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm that, given an n-dimensional lattice
L(A), and a number r > λn(L(A)) · ω
(√
logn
)
, outputs a
sample from a distribution that is within negligible distance
of DL(A),r.
B. Learning With Errors
We now give an overview of the Learning With Errors
problem. The reader may note the similarities between this
problem and the problem of MIMO decoding. In particular, the
Learning with Errors problem is very similar to the problem
presented in this paper except that Learning with Errors is set
entirely over integer fields, whereas MIMO decoding is set
in the reals. We take advantage of the results related to the
Learning with Errors problem to show the hardness of MIMO
decoding.
The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem was first presented
by Regev in [13]. The problem allows one to have an arbitrary
number of samples of “noisy random inner products” of the
form
(a, y = 〈a,x〉 + e) , (9)
where a ∈ Znq , x ∈ Znq , and e ∈ Zq . Each a is random from
the uniform distribution over Znq , and each e is drawn from
a discrete Gaussian distribution with a small second moment
(relative to q). This problem is an extension of the classic
learning-parity with noise problem of machine learning. As
with many hard problems, the LWE problem has two variants:
the search and decision variants. These two problems are
related in complexity. In the search variant of the problem, the
goal is to recover the vector x; whereas the decision variant
asks us to distinguish between samples of y and a random
distribution. If we fix the number of samples to which one
has access, the LWE problem becomes analogous to finding
the closest vector in an integer lattice. In [13], Regev proves
that the LWE problem is at least as hard as solving GapSVPn/c
and SIVPn/c in the worst case, but requires the use of a
quantum computer. Peikert in [24] demonstrates a reduction
that does not require a quantum computer for the case where
q = O (2n).
If we fix the number of samples available to the receiver,
then this problem becomes equivalent to decoding a random
linear code. Consider the case where we take a random
generator matrix A ∈ Zm×nq , a vector t = Ax+ e ∈ Zmq and
we wish to recover the vector x. If we restrict m < poly(n),
and provide the proper distribution on e, then decoding this
code is as hard as solving worst-case lattice problems to within
a factor of γ < n/c.
We briefly summarize Regev’s reduction as follows. If an
efficient algorithm exists to solve LWE, then this can be used
to construct an efficient algorithm that solves the BDD problem
for any n-dimensional lattice. This step is somewhat surprising
as it allows us to use the LWE algorithm, which operates on
an integer lattice reduced modulo q, to solve BDD for any real
lattice. How this step is accomplished is not entirely intuitive,
but requires one to convert a single instance of BDD into an
arbitrary number of samples of the distribution defined in the
LWE problem. This step also requires as an input samples of
a number of lattice points drawn from a discrete Gaussian
distribution with a large second moment. With an efficient
algorithm to solve BDD, it is possible to generate a distribution
of lattice points which has a smaller second moment than input
in the previous step. The above process can now be iterated
with this new distribution of lattice points to solve BDD with a
larger bounding distance than before. Repeating this step will
eventually result in a distribution of lattice points with a very
small second moment, which will reveal information about
the shortest vectors of the lattice, allowing us to approximate
solutions to GapSVP and SIVP.
This step, using an LWE algorithm to solve any instance
of the BDD problem, turns out to be extremely useful to
characterize the hardness of MIMO decoding. In particular,
we will show that if we have an efficient algorithm for MIMO
decoding, then this algorithm can be used to efficiently to solve
instances of the BDD problem. Then, with an efficient BDD
algorithm, Regev’s quantum reductions to worst-case lattice
problems follow. Additionally for large M , Peikert’s classical
reduction follows.
C. Lattice-Based Cryptography
In recent years, lattice-based cryptography has become
a very attractive field for cryptographers for a number of
reasons. The security guarantees provided by many lattice-
based schemes far exceeds that of many modern schemes such
as RSA and Diffie-Hellman, since lattice problems enjoy an
average-to-worst case connection, as discussed in Appendix
B. Lattice problems also appear to be resistant to quantum
7Figure 3. A map of reductions relating MIMO decoding (the MIMO-search
problem) to solving standard lattice problems and the LWE problem. If there
exists an efficient algorithm to solve the MIMO-Search problem, then this
implies solutions to standard lattice problems. Since lattice problems are
conjectured to be hard, this conjecture follows for the hardness of the MIMO-
search problem. In this figure, M refers to the constellation size used in the
MIMO system.
computers. The creation of such computers poses a significant
challenge to the state of modern cryptography, since a quantum
computer could break most modern number-theoretic schemes.
In addition, many proposed lattice schemes are competitive
with, or better than, many modern number-theoretic schemes
in terms of both key size and the computational efficiency of
encryption and decryption [37]. For these reasons, a number
of lattice-based cryptography standards are being developed
or have been developed recently by both the IEEE and the
financial industry ([38], [39]).
Lattice-based cryptography provides cryptographers with a
wide variety of tools to create many different cryptographic
constructions. We here reference some of these constructions
as it is possible that some of them could be applied to the
MIMO decoding problem or even that the MIMO decoding
construction could inspire entirely new cryptographic con-
structions. Importantly, the LWE problem can be extended to
cyclotomic rings ([40]), which can improve the efficiency
(in terms of key size and complexity of the encryption and
decryption operations) of cryptosystems based on LWE. In [13],
a system that is secure against Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA-
secure) is presented and in [24] a Chosen-Ciphertext Attack
secure (CCA-secure) system is presented. In addition, the LWE
problem has been used to create a wide range of useful cryp-
tographic primitives such as identity-based encryption ([41]),
oblivious transfer ([42]), zero-knowledge systems ([43]), and
pseudorandom functions ([44]). The LWE problem was also
used to construct a fully homomorphic cryptosystem [45],
solving a long-standing open problem in cryptography.
IV. MAIN THEOREM
In this section we state our main theorem regarding the
computational hardness of MIMO− SearchM,α,k. We show
that given an efficient algorithm which can solve this problem,
there exist efficient solutions to the problems of GapSVPn/α
and SIVPn/α. The reduction is based off the work of [13] and
involves a step using a quantum computer. In [24] this step
is removed, but the hardness is only related to the GapSVP
problem. The relation between the reductions used to show
the hardness of MIMO decoding and the reductions used to
show the hardness of LWE is shown in Figure 3. Examples of
parameters which meet the requirements stated in Theorem 1
are shown in Table I. The proof of this theorem is found in
Appendix A.
Theorem 1. MIMO− SearchM,α,k to GapSVPn/α and
SIVPn/α. Let m > 0, α ∈ R, k ∈ R, M > m 2n log logn/ logn,
be such that mα/k2 >
√
n. Assume we have an efficient al-
gorithm that solves MIMO− SearchM,α,k, given a polynomial
number of samples from Ax,α,k. Then there exists an efficient
quantum algorithm that, given an n-dimensional lattice L(A),
solves the problems GapSVPn/α and SIVPn/α. Hence, since
GapSVPn/α and SIVPn/α are conjectured to be hard, it is
also conjectured that MIMO-Search is hard.
An outline of the reductions is shown in Figure 3. Figure 3
also relates the work of Regev and Peikert to our work. The
steps used to prove the theorem are outlined as follows:
• We first show that, given the MIMO oracle as described in
Section II, we can solve problems where the coefficients
of the channel gain matrix are instead drawn from a
discrete Gaussian distribution as described in Lemma 1
in Appendix A.
• We begin by reducing a lattice basis A by using the
Lensta-Lensta-Lovász (LLL) lattice-basis reduction algo-
rithm. We then, using the procedure described in [33],
create a discrete Gaussian distribution on this lattice, with
a second moment around the length of the largest vector
given in the reduced basis. We use this as the starting
point for the iterative portion of the algorithm.
• The main step in the proof is given in Lemma 7, where we
use this MIMO decoding oracle to solve the BDD problem
given access to a DGS oracle. This allows us to directly
use the results from Regev [13] and Peikert [24].
• In Lemma 8, from [13], the BDD oracle is used to
(quantumly) solve DGSL∗,√n/(√2d), that is return samples
of DL∗,r. Note that we can efficiently sample from DL,r
for r > ηǫ(L). If in Lemma 7 we set parameters so
that
√
2d >
√
n, then we can reduce the value of r to
below the value for which we could previously efficiently
sample, that is we can construct a distribution that is more
narrow than previously possible.
• The BDD and DGS oracles can now be applied iteratively,
shrinking the second moment of the discrete Gaussian
distribution with each iteration. Eventually, the distribu-
tion becomes narrow enough to reveal information about
the shortest vectors of the lattice, thereby solving the
GapSVPn/α and SIVPn/α problems.
V. SECURITY AND THE MIMO WIRETAP CHANNEL
In the previous sections we have shown that the MIMO wiretap
model is secure in the sense that the decoding complexity of
any eavesdropper is exponential in the number of transmit
antennas. In this section, we relate this notion of security for
our system to other notions of security used by information
theorists and cryptographers.
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MAXIMUM SNRS
n log2M SNR (dB)
80 33.7 87.1
128 51.3 139.2
196 75.4 210.7
256 96 272.2
Example sets of parameters for various numbers of transmit antennas. In order
for the security proofs contained in this paper, the system must meet these
minimum constellation size and maximum SNR values. Here we set m = 1.
Until this section, we have referred to the third user on
Alice and Bob’s public channel to be an eavesdropper. This
implies that the eavesdropper is passive and has no ability
but to receive and decode information. In practice, this model
is limited and, in order to provide more practical and robust
notions of security, a more powerful adversarial model should
be considered. The need for using more robust security models
in the study of physical-layer security was recently discussed
in [23]. In this work the author suggests bridging the gap
between notions of security in information theory and cryp-
tography in order to make physical-layer schemes more widely
accepted by the security community. Considering an adversary
which, for example, has the ability to manipulate, inject,
alter or duplicate information is considered essential when
a cryptographer develops and designs a cryptosystem, but is
rarely, if ever, considered in information-theoretic settings. In
this section, we discuss stronger adversarial models which
are commonly considered in cryptography and show how to
use the hardness result derived in Section IV in order to
construct secure schemes under these models. We note that
there are many other adversarial models studied in the field of
cryptography which we do not discuss here. A more complete
discussion of these models is provided in [1].
In this section, we present two ways in which Alice and Bob
can securely use our result. In the first scheme, we show how
Alice may securely transmit a message to Bob. This scheme
achieves both the notion of Chosen Plaintext Security (also
known as Semantic Security) as well as Chosen Ciphertext
Security. However, the downside of this scheme is that it
relies on additional cryptographic primitives and assumptions:
this scheme is secure in what cryptographers call the Random
Oracle Model, which we describe in Section V.B. In Section
V.C, we present a simple scheme which allows Alice and
Bob to agree on a secret key which, in order to be practical,
must take on additional assumptions about Eve’s ability to
approximately decode. Constructing a cryptosystem which is
provably secure using only the assumptions listed in Section II
is not readily apparent. We believe that the schemes proposed
are practical and that applying these notions of security in
the context of physical-layer security is not only novel, but
makes substantial progress in bridging ideas from information-
theoretic security and cryptography, as discussed in [23].
A. Information-Theoretic Security
We have shown that it is hard for Eve to decode Alice’s
message. However, we defined decoding as exactly recovering
the message without error. This is not the same as stating
that, information-theoretically, Eve receives no information
about the message. Consider that Eve applies some suboptimal
decoder that runs in polynomial time (for example, successive
interference cancellation or zero-forcing decoding). Eve would
then get some estimate for Alice’s message with some bit error
rate that is potentially less than half. In some sense, this is
insecure as it implies that Eve in fact receives information
about Alice’s message. In this section, we provide a means
to use our system in a manner that is in fact secure under
cryptographic notions of security rather than information-
theoretic ones.
Under the widely accepted conjecture that lattice problems
cannot efficiently be approximated to even subexponential
factors, Eve can at best recover a constellation point that
is exponentially far away from Alice’s transmitted vector.
Effectively, this means that for a single channel use, Eve can
reduce the number of possible transmitted vectors from Mn
to 2O(n).
We could use this result in an information-theoretic sense
along with our hardness result to say that there is now a
positive secrecy rate in the wiretap channel, which could
be accomplished through either a key rate, coding, or using
a transmission strategy that takes into account the channel
characteristics of Bob and/or Eve (e.g. puts a null in the
direction of Eve). While this approach would extend existing
results on information-theoretic secrecy, it is different from
our approach in two main aspects, as we now describe.
First, assume that the average received SNR at Bob’s
location is identical to the average received SNR at Eve’s
location and, at both locations, the sufficient conditions of our
hardness result holds. Since the channel gain matrices between
Alice and Bob and Alice and Eve have the same distribution,
on average they have the same number of spatial streams that
can be supported and at the same SNR. In other words, the
mutual information between the channel input and the output
at Bob and at Eve is the same, unless the input is encoded
in a manner that allows Bob to decode whereas Eve cannot.
This will reduce the mutual information between Alice and
Eve, possibly to zero. On the other hand, our approach shows
that there is (likely) no efficient algorithm that allows Eve to
decode, and thus, practically, if Eve is subject to complexity
constraints she will receive less information than Bob. To our
knowledge, this notion of information exchange, based on the
conjectured complexity of decoding, is novel.
Second, relying on the information theoretic secrecy argu-
ment does not provide a constructive result. By this we mean
that it merely shows the existence of a scheme that allows for
Alice and Bob to reliably and securely communicate, rather
than actually providing such a scheme, as is the case for most
information-theoretic results. In contrast, the cryptographic
notion of security that we use in fact gives a practical scheme
for secure communication.
B. Secure Message Transmission in the Random Oracle Model
We have shown that it is computationally infeasible for Eve
to exactly recover Alice’s transmitted message, but Bob can
decode in polynomial time. This implies that (assuming lattice
9problems are hard) the MIMO channel naturally forms what
cryptographers call a secure one-way trapdoor function2. In
this subsection, we construct a secure cryptosystem by using a
standard cryptographic construction, known as OAEP+ (Opti-
mal Asymmetric Encryption Padding). OAEP+ was introduced
in [46] as an improvement to the original OAEP scheme given
in [47]. The results of [46] allow for the construction of a
secure cryptographic system given any one-way permutation.
The results imply that, in the random oracle model, the re-
sulting system has the properties of Chosen Ciphertext (CCA)
Security and Chosen Plaintext (CPA) Security. Precisely, the
security of our system follows from the following theorem,
which is proven in [46] for any one way permutation. The
fact that the MIMO-Search problem is one way, under the
assumption that lattice problems are hard, is given by Theorem
23. Theorem 2 gives strong evidence that at least one bit (and
likely more) will remain computationally hidden from Eve,
and thus Eve will learn no information about the transmitted
message.
Theorem 2. [51, Thm. 3] If the underlying trapdoor permuta-
tion is one way, then OAEP+ is secure against adaptive chosen
ciphertext attack in the random oracle model.
We now give an informal treatment of CPA and CCA
Security, as well as the random oracle model. For a formal
treatment, see [1] or [48]. A reader familiar with these notions
may wish to skip ahead to Algorithm 1.
Succinctly, the condition necessary to achieve security under
Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA security – here we describe
the notion referred to as IND-CPA) is that an adversary
must be unable (without violating our computational hardness
assumptions) to match up pairs of plaintext (unencrypted data)
and ciphertext (encrypted data). This notion of CPA security
was formally introduced in [49]. There are many reasons why
such a notion of security is needed. For example, consider
that an adversary knows that a user communicates with only a
known small subset of possible messages. If the adversary
can match plaintext and ciphertext, then the adversary can
exhaustively search over the possible transmitted messages and
learn the message.
We illustrate the value of this notion of security with an
example from our model in Figure 1. Sending non-random
messages, or messages from a source with a small entropy,
could be problematic from a security perspective. Consider,
for example, that Alice is casting a vote in an election
which she sends to the election official, Bob. In the election,
there are a small number, v, of candidates. Alice votes by
sending some message xi, for i ∈ [0, v), which is predefined,
and publicly known, for each candidate. Eve could receive
y = Bxi + e, and compute the l2 norm between y and
each possible {Bx0, . . . ,Bxv−1} and tell with some certainty
2A one-way function is a function which can be evaluated in polynomial
time, but requires exponential complexity to invert. Such functions are
conjectured to exist, but proving their existence is an open problem and would
prove P 6= NP.
3The MIMO channel maps messages from bits to real values and thus is
a function and not a permutation. However, the MIMO search problem asks
Eve to decode a MIMO signal back to bits, and thus we can view the process
of transmitting, detecting and decoding as a permutation of the message bits.
which candidate received Alice’s vote. If instead Alice trans-
mits her vote using a scheme that is CPA secure, receiving
the vector y will convey no information about Alice’s vote to
Eve.
Security under Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA) is a
stronger notion than CPA security (and in fact CCA security,
as described here, implies CPA security, see [48]). Under the
CCA adversarial model, an adversary first gets access to a
decryption oracle (but not the secret key) and is allowed to
present his choice of ciphertext to the oracle and learn the
corresponding plaintext. Then after loosing access to this ora-
cle, the adversary is then challenged to match pairs of plaintext
and ciphertext. This is also referred to as a “lunchtime”, non-
adaptive CCA security, or IND-CCA1. In a stronger notion of
CCA security (known as adaptive CCA or IND-CCA2), the
adversary can continue to submit queries to the oracle after
being presented with the challenge plaintext and ciphertext
pairs, under the condition that he does not submit the challenge
ciphertext to the oracle.
The necessity for CCA security in the context of our system
is not as readily apparent as it is in a traditional keyed
cryptosystem. Suppose, for example, a device exists which
decrypts ciphertext, but from which a party cannot recover the
secret key. If an adversary is given access to such a device,
then a CCA secure cryptosystem is still secure given that this
access is temporary. In our system model however, such a
device cannot exist: the ability for Bob to decode Alice’s
messages depends on both Alice and Bob to be at certain
spatial locations and not on the possession of a key. In fact,
when Eve receives a message through the wiretap channel, she
receives the vector BVx+ e, which was precoded for Bob’s
channel. There is no way for anyone to efficiently decode
this vector. Nonetheless, our system is still secure if such an
oracle were to exist, as adaptive CCA security (and hence CPA
security) follows from using the OAEP+ construction.
The Random Oracle model was introduced by [50]. The
model assumes that parties have access to an oracle which
choses uniformly at random a function which maps each pos-
sible input query into its output domain. When implemented
in a practical scheme, such an oracle can be replaced by
a cryptographic hash function, such as the SHA family of
hashes. For many cryptographic hash functions, proving cer-
tain security properties is a difficult task. The Random Oracle
model provides cryptographers an idealized model of a hash
function to make possible rigorous analysis of cryptographic
constructions that include such hash functions. Constructions
which are provably secure under the Random Oracle model
have been standardized and their use is extremely common.
The proposed scheme is given in Algorithm 1, which simply
encodes a message using the OAEP+ construction given in
[46] before transmitting the message over the MIMO channel.
As a result of this encoding, the decoder must receive the
message x without error in order to decode. If the decoder
has even a single error, then the resulting output will be
computationally indistinguishable from uniform random by
Theorem 2 and the one-wayness of the MIMO channel.
We note that this algorithm requires Bob to receive a perfect
copy of the message x through the MIMO channel. However,
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Algorithm 1 MIMO-OAEP+
Let K = n logM be the number of bits transmitted per MIMO
channel use. Alice wishes to send Bob a message, m, that is
η = K − 2n bits. Assume Alice and Bob both have access to
three random oracle functions: G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}η , H ′ :
{0, 1}n+η → {0, 1}n , H : {0, 1}n+η → {0, 1}n. Alice
computes s ∈ {0, 1}n+η , t ∈ {0, 1}n , x ∈ {0, 1}K as shown
under Encrypt below. Alice then multiplies x by the right
singular vectors of Bob’s channel and transmits the message
to Bob. Bob recovers x through his channel and then recovers
m using the proceedure shown under Decrypt. Bob verifies
that c = H ′(r‖m). If these quantities are not equal then Bob
has not properly received Alice’s message and he rejects.
Encrypt Decrypt
s = (G(r) ⊕m) ‖H ′(r‖m) s = x[0, . . . , η + n− 1]
t = H(s)⊕ r t = x[η + n, . . . , k]
x = s‖t r = H(s)⊕ t
m = G(r) ⊕ s[0, . . . , η − 1]
c = s[η . . . , η + n− 1]
c
?
= H ′(r‖m)
Bob receives this message through a channel with Gaussian
noise and thus has some probability of error that he does not
receive this message perfectly. In fact, given the large noise
requirement in Theorem 2, it can be shown that the symbol
error rate at Bob’s location will be close to one, even when
Bob has a large number of antennas.
In order to allow Alice and Bob to communicate, we must
reduce the rate of communication between them; however, in
order to allow for Theorem 2 to hold, we must still maintain
the large constellation size and noise requirement. Both of
these objectives can be accomplished through the use of error
correcting codes. Note, however, that if we encode the message
x with a code that can correct up to e errors, then this also
aids Eve in recovering the plaintext. Because Eve cannot apply
ML decoding, she will experience an increased error rate over
Bob. We can use this fact to construct a code which Bob can
decode but Eve cannot.
1) Eavesdropper Decoding: We now consider the limits
to which Eve can estimate the message x which is not
precoded for her channel. The analysis in this section describes
how much Eve’s estimate of x differs from its maximum-
likelihood, which we denote as xˆ. We obtain a lower bound on
this distortion by considering state-of-the-art algorithms which
are used to attack lattice-based cryptography schemes. We
begin by stating a conjecture about the limits of approximating
lattice algorithms. This conjecture is widely accepted to be
true (see [3], for example) and discussed in more detail in
Appendix B:
Conjecture 1. There is no polynomial time algorithm which
can approximate SIVP to within polynomial factors.
Alice transmits a message x ∈ [0,M)n, which is distributed
uniformly, across her channel. Eve receives this message
through her channel and can apply her favorite lattice-basis
reduction algorithm to decoding the message, but is unable
to obtain a lattice basis that is within a polynomial factor
of the shortest basis. She can use this shorter basis along
with Babai’s nearest plane algorithm [52] to recover a vector,
x′, that is a super-polynomial distance away from xˆ, that is
‖x′− xˆ‖ > 2ω(logn). The fact that Eve can recover this vector
x′ implies that Eve can in fact learn a non-negligible amount
of information about Alice’s message.
In order to more precisely determine the length of the
basis which Eve can practically find, one can consider the
current state-of-the-art for lattice basis reduction algorithms,
For a study on limits of lattice basis reduction algorithms,
see [53], for a more general overview see [3]. In [53], the
authors suggest that the closest Eve can decode relative to the
original message (given a realistic amount of computational
resources) is bounded by ‖x′ − xˆ‖ > 22
√
n logM log 1.005
.
According to [53], this is an extremely conservative estimate,
and we claim that it would require either an infeasible amount
of computational resources or a substantial advancement in
lattice-basis reduction algorithms for Eve to learn more about
the original message than this bound indicates.
In order to prevent Eve from being able to recover a
coded version of the message x, we apply a code which
has a minimum distance dmin ≤ 22
√
n logM log 1.005
. With
high probability, Eve will be unable to recover an error-free
estimate of x, and will be unable learn any information about
the message m sent using Algorithm 1.
2) Correctness: We now show that, if Alice encodes the
output of Algorithm 1 with an error-correcting code of dmin =
22
√
n logM log 1.005
, then given a sufficient number of recieve
antennas, Bob will be able to receive and decode the vector
x without error, thus allowing him to recover the message m
from Algorithm 1. We proceed by choosing the parameters
M = 2n log logn/ logn,m = 1, α = 1, and k = 1, but this
analysis is easily generalized to other parameters which meet
our security condition.
Assume that Bob has nr = t ·n receiever antennas for some
t > 2. With probability at most 2e−n/2, the smallest singular
value in the channel between Alice and Bob will be at least√
(t− 2)n (see for example \cite{rudelson}, Eq. 2.3). This
implies that the noise variance in each of the decomposed
channels between Alice and Bob will decrease by at least of a
factor of
√
(t− 2)n compared to the ambient channel noise.
For Bob to be able to decode, we now require the following
condition to hold with some reasonable probability:
Mα√
(t− 2)n < 2
2
√
n logM log 1.005, (10)
where the left-hand side is an upper bound of the noise
variance in each of Alice and Bob’s parallel channels, and
the right-hand side is the minimum distance of the error
correcting code employed by Alice. Substituting the values
of our constants, this gives us:
t >
2.86
n
(11)
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and thus, for any t > 2, the probabily of having a symbol
error when Bob decodes is bounded below by:
erfc
( nr
2.86
)
= negl(n), (12)
where erfc(·) represents the complimentary error function. We
note that the condition that t > 2 is only neccessary so that,
with overhelming probability, there will be no ill conditioned
channels in the parallel decomposition between Alice and Bob.
For large n, the probability of error will remain small for
values of t close to 1.
C. Secret Key Agreement and Computational Secrecy Capac-
ity
We now proceed to describe a secret key transmission pro-
tocol. In the context of our model in Figure 1, such a protocol
allows Alice to transmit a “secret” to Bob in the form of bits
undecodable by Eve. Information-theoretic protocols which
achieve this secret key transmission based on equivocation
at the eavesdropper are known, for example [51]. Here we
present a protocol in which the key is kept secret under
computational rather than information-theoretic assumptions.
We call the number of bits Alice can securely transmit to
Bob per channel use under computational assumptions the
Computational Secrecy Capacity.
Alice transmits a message m ∈ [0,M)n chosen uniformly at
random through her channel. This message has n logM bits
of entropy. By similar reasoning to the previous subsection,
Eve receives this message through her channel and recovers
a vector, m′, such that ‖m −m′‖ > 22
√
n logM log 1.005
. The
fact that Eve can recover this vector m′ implies that Eve can
in fact learn a non-negligible amount of information about
Alice’s message. Here we argue that, in the context of our
proposed schemes, this information is in fact useless unless
Eve can violate our computational assumptions.
Achieving this bound in terms of Eve’s ability to decode
the transmitted message implies that the entropy associated
with Eve’s estimate of m is at least 2
√
n logM log 1.005. By
applying the leftover hash lemma [55], it follows that Alice
can transmit to Bob 2
√
n logM log 1.005 bits of information
per message without Eve learning any (non-negligible) amount
of information about the message. Thus, the security of the
bits transmitted via the scheme described in Algorithm 2
immediately holds. The quantity 2
√
n logM log 1.005 is the
Computational Secrecy Capacity of our model in Figure 1.
Table II gives examples of the computational secrecy capacity
for various parameters.
Algorithm 2 requires the use of a universal hash function,
which we briefly define as a function which takes an arbitrary-
sized input and returns a fixed-size output (the hash value). A
universal hash is constructed so that there is a low expectation
that two distinct inputs chosen adversarially hash to the same
value (collide). The leftover hash lemma [55] essentially states
that using a universal hash function allows us to extract
randomness from a source from which an adversary has
partial information, such that the adversary is left almost no
information about the output of the hash function.
Algorithm 2 Key-Agreement Scheme
Alice wishes to send Bob η secret bits. Alice generates some
number c = c(n), such that 2c
√
n logM log 1.005 > η,
of random messages m ∈ [0,M)n and sends them to Bob
over the MIMO channel with channel parameters meeting
the constraints in Theorem 1. Alice and Bob ensure that
the message is exchanged without error for example through
channel coding. Alice and Bob then hash the message (after
decoding if channel coding is used), using a universal hash
which outputs η bits and use the result as their secret.
Table II
COMPUTATIONAL SECRECY CAPACITY
n log2M SNR (dB) Computational Secrecy Capacity
80 33.7 87.1 8.80
128 51.3 139.2 13.75
196 75.4 210.7 20.62
256 96 272.2 26.60
For unit channel gain variance, the minimum constellation size, and the
minimum SNR that meets the noise requirements for the hardness condition
to hold. Computational Secrecy Capacity gives the number of bits Alice can
securely transmit to Bob per channel use using Algorithm 1.
We note that if Alice and Bob use channel coding to
ensure for reliable communications, then the rate of the coding
scheme employed would also effect the number of bits Alice
and Bob could securely exchange per channel use. That is,
if Alice and Bob used a scheme that could correct up to
e bit errors, then the bound on η must be reduced by e
bits. Similarly, this quantity, 2
√
n logM log 1.005, also serves
maximum number of bit errors that can be allowed to be
corrected in any code chosen between Alice and Bob in the
scheme given in Section V.B.
D. Computational Attacks
We wish to briefly note the importance of maintaining
the security parameters as stated in Theorem 1. When the
minimum noise requirement is not met, it is possible that
attacks follow on our system. By attack, we mean that an
adversary could, by applying a sub-exponential algorithm in
order to decode. As an example, in [56], the authors show an
attack on a version of our system with security parameters not
meeting those defined in Theorem 1. Finally, we note that it
is not apparent that an attack follows immediately for smaller
values of M than required in Theorem 1, but we leave it as an
open question as to whether or not it can be shown that Eve
can successfully decode with non-exponential complexity for
smaller values of M, or if a smaller bound on the requirement
for M can be found that still entails decoding to be hard for
Eve.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated that the complexity of an eaves-
dropper decoding a large-scale MIMO systems with M-PAM
modulation can be related to solving certain lattice problems
which are widely conjectured to be hard. This suggests that
the complexity of solving these problems grows exponentially
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with the number of transmitter antennas. Unlike the computa-
tionally hard problems underlying many of the most common
encryption methods used today, such as RSA and Diffie-
Hellman, it is believed that the underlying lattice problems are
hard to solve using a quantum computer, and thus this scheme
presents a practical solution to post-quantum cryptography.
It is not new to exploit properties of a communication
channel to achieve security; however, to our knowledge, this
is the first scheme which uses physical properties of the
channel to achieve security based on computational complexity
arguments. Indeed, the notion of the channel is not typically
considered by cryptographers. We thus describe our system as
a way of achieving physical-layer cryptography.
Further novel to our scheme is the role that the channel gain
matrix plays in decoding. A transmitted message can only be
decoded by a user with the corresponding channel gain matrix.
The channel gain matrix, or more specifically the precoding
of the message using the right-singular vectors of the channel
gain matrix, essentially plays the role of a secret key in that
it allows for efficient decoding at the receiver. However, this
value does not need to be kept secret, nor does it play the
traditional role of a public key. We term this type of key as
the Channel State Information- or CSI-key. In cryptography
terminology, this system is a trapdoor function, for which the
trapdoor varies both spatially and temporally. The fact that
this is a new type of cryptographic primitive suggests the
possibility of entirely new cryptographic constructions.
We have used the hardness result, in conjunction with a
new notion of computational secrecy capacity, to construct
a method in which two users can perform a key-agreement
scheme, without a pre-shared secret. In addition, we give a
scheme that allows Alice and Bob to securely communicate
in the presence of an eavesdropper. We relate the parame-
ters required to maintain security to SNR requirements and
constellation size and show that they are practical to achieve
assuming a system with enough transmitter antennas and
the corresponding number of receivers, and relatively large
constellation sizes.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF MAIN THEOREM
Theorem 1. MIMO− SearchM,α,k to GapSVPn/α and
SIVPn/α. Let α > 0, m > 0 , k > 0 be such that
mα/k2 >
√
n, and M > m 2n log logn/ logn. Assume we have
access to an oracle that solves MIMO− SearchM,α,k, given a
polynomial number of samples from AM,α,k. Then there exists
an efficient quantum algorithm that given an n-dimensional
lattice L(A), solves the problems GapSVPn/α and SIVPn/α.
Additionally, there exists a classical solution to GapSVPn/α.
Proof: The lemmas required to prove this theorem are
given below. We summarize the proof of the main theorem as
follows.
1) We first show that, given the MIMO oracle as described
in Section II, we can solve problems where the coeffi-
cients of the channel gain matrix are instead drawn from
a discrete Gaussian distribution as described in Lemma
1.
2) We begin with an arbitrary lattice basis A and apply
the LLL algorithm. We then create a discrete Gaussian
distribution on this lattice, with a second moment around
the length of the largest vector given in the reduced
basis. We use this as the starting point for the iterative
portion of the algorithm.
3) In Lemma 7, we use this MIMO decoding oracle to
solve the BDD problem. The input to this problem is
an (arbitrary) n-dimensional lattice L(A), a number
r >
√
2ηǫ (L(A)), and a target point y within distance
d < Mσα/k2r
√
2 (the bounding distance) of L(A).
We take this instance of a BDD problem and, using a
number of samples from the distribution DL∗,r, we are
able to construct a number of samples in the form of
(A, y = 〈a,x〉+ e), in the exact form of distribution
expected by MIMO decoding oracle using Lemma 1.
Here, returning the correct vector x solves the BDD
problem. We now have an oracle which solves the BDD
problem for arbitrary lattices.
4) In Lemma 8, from [13], the BDD oracle is used to (quan-
tumly) solve DGSL∗,√n/(√2d), that is return samples
of DL∗,r. Note we can efficiently sample from DL,r
for r > ηǫ(L). If, in Lemma 7 we set parameters so
that
√
2d >
√
n, then we can reduce the value of
r to below the value for which we could previously
efficiently sample, that is we can construct a distribution
that is more narrow than previously possible.
5) In [13], the steps of Lemma 7 and 8 are iteratively
applied, resulting in a more narrow distribution of lat-
tice points. Eventually, this distribution becomes narrow
enough to reveal information about the shortest vectors
of the lattice, solving the GapSVPn/α and SIVPn/α. We
refer the reader to [13] for the rigorous treatment of this
process.
6) We refer the reader to [24] for the classical reduction,
which requires an oracle to solve the BDD problem. Re-
placing Regev’s LWE-based BDD oracle with our MIMO-
based BDD oracle, the classical reduction follows.
A. Smoothing Parameter.
Before we prove the main theorem, we review the smoothing
parameter and state some of its properties that we will require
in our proof. The smoothing parameter was introduced in [34]
and is an important property of the behavior of a discrete
Gaussian distribution on lattices. It is precisely defined as
follows.
Definition 5. For an n-dimensional lattice L(A) and a real
ǫ > 0, the smoothing parameter, ηǫ(L(A)), is the smallest α
such that Ψ1/α (L∗(A)\ {0}) ≤ ǫ.
The smoothing parameter defines the smallest standard
deviation such that, when the inverse is sampled over the
dual L∗(A), all but a negligible amount of weight is on the
origin. More intuitively, it is the width at which a discrete
Gaussian measure begins to behave as a continuous one. The
motivation for the name ‘smoothing parameter’ is given in
[34]. For α >
√
2ηǫ(L), if we sample lattice points from DL,α
then add Gaussian noise Ψα, then the resulting distribution is
13
at most distance 4ǫ from Gaussian. We borrow the following
two technical claims from [34].
Claim 2. [34, Lemma 3.2]. For any n-dimensional lattice
L(A), ηǫ (L) ≤
√
n/λ1 (L∗(A)) where ǫ = 2−n.
More generally, we can characterize the smoothing param-
eter for any ǫ.
Claim 3. [34, Lemma 3.3]. For any n-dimensional lattice
L(A) and ǫ > 0,
ηǫ(L) ≤
√
ln(2n(1 + 1/ǫ))
π
· λn(A). (13)
Equivalently, for any superlogarithmic function ω (logn),
ηǫ(L) ≤
√
ω (logn) · λn(A).
We will also note the following property of the smoothing
parameter, which follows from the linearity of lattices. If we
scale the basis of a lattice, then all of the successive minima
will scale by the same amount:
Claim 4. For any n-dimensional lattice L(A),ǫ > 0, and c >
0,ηǫ(L (c ·A)) = c · ηǫ(L (A)).
B. Preliminary Lemmas
Before we can proceed with the main part of the proof show-
ing the reduction from standard lattice problems to the MIMO
decoding problem, we require several preliminary lemmas. We
will first show, in Lemma 1, that it is sufficient to solve the
MIMO decoding from a discrete Gaussian distribution rather
than a continuous one. This distribution is used as input to the
MIMO oracle in Lemma 7. We define the distribution DM,α,k,
which is the discrete analog of the distribution AM,α,k. Given
an arbitrary lattice L(A), and a number r > √2ηǫ(L(A)), we
first sample a vector a from the distribution DL(A),r, and a
point e from the distribution ψα. We now output:(
ka
r
,y =
〈
ka
r
,x
〉
/M + e
)
(14)
Lemma 1. Continuous-to-Discrete Samples. Given an oracle
which can solve MIMO− DecisionM,α,k, there exists an effi-
cient algorithm to recover x given samples from DM,α,k.
Proof: We first claim that every point in the distribution
DL(A),r is proportional to ψr, to within a negligible amount.
This effectively follows from the fact that we choose r to
be larger than the square root of two times the smoothing
parameter of the lattice (formally, see equation 11 of [13,
Claim 3.9]).
We now create a unitary transformation that can be applied
to both a and y, creating a˜ and y˜, so that the support of a˜ is
effectively Rn. W do not have to actually cover all of Rn, nor
do we in fact have to come close to doing so. Our algorithms,
by assumption, can only approximate points in Rn to within
a factor of 2−nc , for some c > 0. Thus, we only need to have
a support in which no point is more than a distance of 2−nc
away from any point in Rn. Then, by the fact that we choose
a unitary transformation, all norms and inner products will be
preserved, and we will achieve our desired result. We describe
an appropriate transformation as follows.
Take two samples from the discrete distribution, call them
(ai,yi) and (aj ,yj). Now generate two numbers ci, cj ∈
Z2nc , uniformly, and output(
ciai + cjaj
ci + cj
,
ciyi + cjyj
ci + cj
)
=
(
ciai + cjaj
ci + cj
,
〈
ciai + cjaj
ci + cj
,x
〉
+
ciei + cjej
ci + cj
)
since each e is generated i.i.d., it is not hard to see that the
noise has the correct distribution. Similarly, since each a is
i.i.d., moments of the quantity ciai+cjajci+cj will be unchanged,
and this quantity will be proportional to the desired Gaussian
distribution. We have now increased the support of the distri-
bution. Indeed, the support of the quantities cici+cj and
cj
ci+cj
covers every point in the interval [0, 1) to within a factor of
2−n
c
, and this new distribution will be indistinguishable from
the distribution expected by the MIMO oracle.
We next state the following claim which is proven in [13]
and shows that a small change in α results in a small change
in the distribution of Ψα. This claim is required in the proofs
of Lemmas 2 and 3.
Claim 5. [13, Claim 2.2]. For any 0 < β < α ≤ 2β,
∆(Ψα,Ψβ) ≤ 9
(
α
β
− 1
)
. (15)
We next show that given a vector x, it is easy to verify
whether or not it is the correct solution to the MIMO-Search
problem:
Lemma 2. Verifying solutions of MIMO− SearchM,α,k . There
exists an efficient algorithm that, given x′ and a polynomial
number of samples from Ax,α,k, for an unknown x, outputs
whether x = x′ with overwhelming probability.
Proof: Let ξ be the distribution on y − 〈a,x′〉. The
same distribution can be obtained by sampling e ∼ Ψα and
outputting e+ 〈a,x− x′〉. In the case x = x′, this reduces to
e, and the distribution on ξ is exactly Ψα. In the case where
x 6= x′, ‖x− x′‖ > 1 by the restriction on our choices of x.
The inner product of 〈a,x− x′〉 is Gaussian with zero mean
and a standard deviation of at least k/
√
2π, and the standard
deviation on e+ 〈a,x− x′〉 must be at least √α2 + k2/√2π.
We now must distinguish between the random variables of Ψα
and Ψ√α2+k2 .
Assuming that k2 is non-negligible in n, then given an
arbitrary number of samples within a polynomial factor of
n, we can distinguish between the two distributions with
overwhelming probability by estimating the sample standard
deviation.
The following lemma is used from [13, Lem. 3.7]. In [13],
the lemma applies to the case of LWE over an integer field,
this proof is repeated in this appendix in order to demonstrate
that it follows for the case of MIMO channels, given Lemma
7. Specifically, this lemma shows that if we can solve the
MIMO problems with noise parameter α, then we can solve
the problems given samples with noise drawn according to
Ψβfor any β ≤ α.
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Lemma 3. [13, Lem 3.7]. Error Handling for β ≤
α. Assume we have access to an oracle which solves
MIMO− SearchM,α,k by using a polynomial number of sam-
ples. Then there exists an efficient algorithm that given sam-
ples from Ax,β,k for some (unknown) β ≤ α, outputs x with
overwhelming probability.
Proof: Assume we have at most nc samples for some
c > 0. Let Z be the set of all integer multiples of n−2cα2
between 0 and α2. For each γ ∈ Z , do the following n times.
For each sample, add a small amount of noise sampled from
Ψ√γ , which creates samples in the form Ax,
√
β2+γ,k
. Apply
the oracle and recover a candidate x′. Use Lemma 2 and check
whether x′ = x. If yes, output x′, otherwise continue.
We now show the correctness of this algorithm. By Lemma
2, a result can be verified to be a correct solution of
MIMO− SearchM,α,k with probability exponentially close to
1. Thus we must only show that in one iteration of the
algorithm, we output samples that are close to Ax,α,k. Con-
sider the smallest γ ∈ Z such that γ ≥ α2 − β2. Then
γ ≤ α2 − β2 + n−2cα2. And
α ≤
√
β2 + γ ≤
√
α2 + n−2cα2 ≤ (1 + n−2c)α.
And by Claim 5, ∆
(
Ψα,Ψ√β2+γ
)
≤ 9n−2c, which is
negligible in n.
Standard lattice problems are formulated with coefficient
vectors that span all integers. In our definition, we have limited
our constellation size. Regev in [13] introduces a variant on
BDDL(A),d, which we designate as BDD
(M)
L(A),d. This problem is
identical to the BDDL(A),d problem, with the exception that
the coefficient vectors of the solution are reduced modulo
M , for arbitrary M . Regev shows that if we can solve this
variant of the problem in polynomial time, there in fact exists
a polynomial time algorithm which solves BDDL(A),d in the
general case. Thus for further lemmas, we can ignore the effect
of the limited constellation size.
Lemma 4. [13, Lem. 3.5]. Finding coefficients modulo M is
sufficient. Given a lattice L(A), a number d < λ1(L(A)/2,
and an integer M ≥ 2, access to an oracle which solves
BDD
(M)
L(A),d, there exists an efficient algorithm that solves
BDDL(A),d.
The following lemma shows that when sufficient noise
is added to a discrete Gaussian variable, it behaves like
a continuous one. This establishes a formal notion of the
structure of the lattice being ‘statistically hidden’ by the noise.
This lemma is used to show that the distribution constructed
in the proof of the main theorem is negligibly close to the
distribution required by the MIMO− Search oracle.
Lemma 5. [13, Cor. 3.10]. For a lattice L(A), vectors
z,u ∈ Rn , and two reals r, α > 0. Assume that
1/
√
1/r2 + (P/α)
2 ≥ ηǫ(A) for some ǫ < 12 . Then the
distribution of 〈z,v〉+ e, where v is distributed according to
DL+u,r, the norm of z is constrained to P , and e is a normal
variable with zero mean and standard deviation α/
√
2π, is
within total variational distance 2ǫ of a normal variable with
zero mean and standard deviation
√
(rP )2 + α2/
√
2π.
We now state the following claim about a polynomial-time
lattice basis reduction algorithm, the LLL algorithm, given in
[32] and improved by Schnorr in [36].
Claim 6. [32], [36]. For some L (A), we apply Schnorr’s
variant of the LLL algorithm, and obtain a new, shorter basis
for this lattice A˜. The norms of the new basis vectors in this
lattice, given by σ1, ..., σn, are bounded by:
σn < 2
n log logn/ lognλn (16)
and
σ1 < 2
n log logn/ lognλ1 (17)
The rest of this proof proceeds with the following assump-
tion:
1 ≤ λn
λ1
< 2n log logn/ logn (18)
The lower bound is evident from Minkowski’s bound, and
the upper bound comes from the fact that we have reduced the
basis by applying the LLL algorithm. While no such upper
bound would exist on an arbitrary lattice, were this ratio to be
bigger than this bound, then the LLL algorithm would have
returned exactly the shortest basis and we would have already
exactly solved the GapSVP and SIVP problems.
C. Reducing MIMO Decoding to Standard Lattice Problems
We now begin the main procedure of the reduction. We
begin by taking the basis and applying the LLL algorithm.
Lemma 6. We start with an arbitrary lattice L(A), and apply
the LLL algorithm to the basis A. We now the use procedure
given in [33] and Schnorr’s variant of LLL to get a distribution
DL,r, for some r > 2n log logn/ lognλn
The following lemma is the main mathematical contribution
of this work, and allows the MIMO oracle to be used in place
of the LWE oracle in the framework of Regev’s reduction
for LWE. From Figure 3, this replacement implies that an
efficient solution of the MIMO decoding problem would also
provide an efficient solution for standard lattice problems.
We briefly restate notation defined in Section II.C: AM,α,k
is the distribution of channel gains and the received signal
from a single antenna in a MIMO system, and DA,α is
the discrete Gaussian distribution drawn over lattice A with
variance proportional to α.
Lemma 7. MIMO− SearchM,α,k to BDDL,r. Let α > 0, k > 0,
m > 0, and M > m 2n log logn/ log n. Assume we have access
to an oracle that, for all β ≤ α, finds x given a polynomial
number of samples from AM,β,k (without knowing β). Then
there exists an efficient algorithm that given an n-dimensional
lattice L(A), a number r > √2η(L(A)), and a target point y
within distance d < Mσα/
(
k2r
√
2
)
of L(A), where σ is the
smallest eigenvalue of ATA, returns the unique x ∈ L(A)
closest to y with overwhelming probability.
Proof: We describe a procedure that, given y, outputs a
polynomial number of samples from the distribution of Dx,β,k.
Then, using the MIMO-Search oracle returns the closest point
x = As.
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First, using Claim 1, sample a vector v ∈ L∗ (A) from
DL∗,r. We now output(
kv/r, k
〈
v,A−1y
〉
/rM + ke/r
) (19)
We note that the right-hand side is equal to
k
〈
v,A−1y
〉
/rM + ke/r =
〈kv/r, s〉 /M + k 〈v,A−1δ〉 /rM + ke/r
We are guaranteed that ‖δ‖ < r. We first note that the
quantity k
〈
v,A−1δ
〉
/r is distributed according to DkL∗/r,ξ,
where ξ < kd/σ. We note that σ relates to the maximum
‘skew’ that results from inverting the matrix A. Since A−1δ
is fixed for all samples, this ‘skew’ is also fixed, meaning the
inner product
〈
v,A−1δ
〉
is symmetric since the distribution
on v is symmetric.
We now add some noise e from the distribution ψα so that
the discrete nature of DkL∗/r,ξ is effectively washed out and
we are left with a distribution that is essentially Gaussian as
expected by the MIMO oracle. That is the distribution of the
noise is within negligible total variational distance of ψβ for
β =
√
ξ2 + α2/2 < α. This condition will be true precisely
when the condition given in Lemma 5 is met. We can see that
this holds:
1/
√
(1/k2 + (
√
2ξ/Mα)2) ≥ k/
√
2 > ηǫ(L∗(kA/r)) (20)
Therefore, the distribution in equation 16 is the distribution
expected by the MIMO oracle and we can recover the vector
x.
In order to relate the MIMO problem to standard lattice
problems, we need the following lemma, given in [13], which
uses a quantum computer.
Lemma 8. [13, Lem. 3.14]. BDDL,α,k to DL∗,√n/(√2d). There
exists an efficient quantum algorithm that, given any n-
dimensional lattice L, a number d < λ1(A)/2, and an oracle
that solves BDDL,d, outputs a sample from DL∗,√n/(√2d).
In order for the reduction to hold, we must have d >√
n/
√
2, or the Gaussian distribution will actually grow in
each iteration of the procedure. We show this in the following
claim.
Claim 7. The inequality Mσα/
(
k2r
√
2
)
>
√
n/
√
2 is true
given the constraints stated in Theorem 1.
Proof: We first set the constraint that mα/k2 > √n, and
thus we only require that Mσ/mr > 1. We can see this is
true:
Mσ
mr
>
2n log logn/ log nσ
r
>
2n log logn/ lognλ1
λn
> 1 (21)
Here, the first step simply applies the bound given on M/m
in Theorem 1, and the second step follows from applying the
bounds on r and σ from Lemma 7 and Claim 6. The final
step follows from applying the bound in equation 13 on the
quantity λn/λ1.
Finally, we require the following lemma from [13, Sec. 3.3],
which uses both the BDD and DGS oracles iteratively to solve
standard lattice problems. By setting d = Mσα/
(
k2r
√
2
)
, we
can iterate between the BDD and the DGS oracles, shrinking
the Gaussian distribution with each step, to a limit, and the
stated standard lattice problems.
Lemma 9. DGSL,√n/(√2d) to standard lattice problems. For
n-dimensional lattice L(A), α > 0, m > 0, k ∈ R such that
mα/k2 >
√
n, and M > m 2n log logn/ log n. Given an oracle
which solves BDDL∗,d and DGSL,√n/(√2d), then there exists an
efficient algorithm that given an n-dimensional lattice L(A),
solves the problems GapSVPn/α and SIVPn/α.
APPENDIX B
COMPLEXITY OF LATTICE PROBLEMS
The security of any lattice-based cryptosystem is based on
the presumed hardness of lattice problems. In this subsection
we limit our discussion to the GapSVPγ and SIVPγ problems.
One well-known algorithm for solving lattice problems is
the LLL algorithm [32]. The algorithm solves SIVPγ and can
be adapted to solving many other lattice problems as well.
The algorithm runs in polynomial time but only achieves an
approximation factor of O (2n). There have been a number of
improvements to this algorithm, such as Schnorr’s algorithm
[36] but none that achieve small approximation factors (to
within even a polynomial factor of n) that run in polynomial
time. All known algorithms that return exact solutions to lattice
problems in fact require a running time on the order of 2n,
see for example [11] or [12]. The hardness of these problems
leads to the following conjecture, stated in [3, Conj. 1.1]:
Conjecture 1. There is no polynomial time algorithm that
approximates lattice problems to within an approximation
factor that is within a polynomial factor of n.
Within certain approximation factors, the complexity class
of solving lattice problems is known. It is NP-Hard to approx-
imate GapSVP to within constant factors [5], [8]–[10]. For a
factor of
√
n, it belongs to the class NP∩CoNP [6], [7]. It
should be noted that our results are based on an approximation
factor of n/c. While such a strong hardness result is not
known for this regime, constructing algorithms to achieve such
approximation factors within polynomial time seems to be out
of reach. These results are summarized in Table III.
Table III
HARDNESS RESULTS FOR STANDARD LATTICE PROBLEMS
γ Hardness Reference
O (1) NP-Hard [5],[8],[9],[10]√
n < γ < n NP∩CoNP [6],[7]
γ ∼ n – [13],[35], This work
2n log log n/ log n P [32],[36]
Another interesting result related to the hardness of lattice
problems considers quantum computation. If a quantum com-
puter were to be realized, this could have profound implica-
tions for the field of cryptography. A quantum computer could
efficiently factor numbers and solve the discrete-logarithm
problem, which would allow for virtually all key-exchange
protocols to be broken in polynomial time [18]. In addition,
algorithms such as Grover’s search algorithm could improve
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exhaustive searches by a factor of a square root, weakening the
security of systems like AES (the Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard, based on the Rijndael cipher) [17]. There are currently
no known quantum algorithms that perform significantly better
than the best known classical algorithms. However, it should
be noted that quantum algorithms are far less understood
and studied than classical algorithms, and thus we have less
assurance that such an algorithm does not exist. We will still
state the following conjecture, given in [3, Conj. 1.2], but note
that this is a weaker conjecture than Conjecture 1:
Conjecture 2. There is no polynomial time quantum algo-
rithm that approximates lattice problems to within polynomial
factors.
Since we show in our main result that the hardness of
decoding MIMO is based on lattice problems, this implies that
MIMO decoding cannot be performed any faster on a quantum
computer. In more general terms, this means that lattice-
based cryptography currently provides promise for efficient
constructions of classical cryptosystems that are secure against
quantum computers.
Besides being conjectured to be hard, many lattice problems
have an additional property that makes them attractive to
cryptographers: for certain problems, there are connections
between the average-case and worst-case complexities. This
allows for the construction of systems which are based on
robust proofs of security. This property and its significance is
described next.
The worst-case complexity refers to the complexity of
solving the problem for the worst possible input of a fixed
size; whereas average-case complexity of a problem refers
to the average complexity of solving a problem given some
underlying distribution of inputs of a fixed size (typically
uniformly random over all possible inputs). A worst-to-average
case reduction gives a distribution of inputs for which the
average complexity of solving a problem is as hard as the
worst case complexity (potentially of a different problem). The
connections between worst- and average-case complexity of
certain lattice problems was first found by Ajtai [5]. Ajtai con-
structed a function that is one-way (that is, it can be computed
in polynomial time, but is hard to invert) on average based
on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems. This result
was used by Ajtai and Dwork to construct a cryptosystem
[35]. These worst-to-average case reductions were extended
by many, but most important to this paper is the reduction
found in [34].
Basing cryptographic systems on problems where a worst-
to-average case reduction exists is an extremely strong guar-
antee of security. It means that it is at least as hard to break
the cryptosystem as it is to solve any instance of the related
problems. Such a strong guarantee is not provided by most
cryptosystems today. For example, breaking a cryptosystem
that is based on factoring (e.g. RSA) only implies a solution
to factoring numbers of a specific form; namely, the specific
form used to generate RSA keys and not a solution to worst-
case factoring problems.
Our scheme does not have an average-to-worst case reduc-
tion, and it is not clear that such a reduction is possible.
This means that there may certain structured inputs which
may make MIMO decoding easy – for example consider
the case that x is sparse. Finding a solution for decoding
MIMO for sparse signals, would certainly not lead to a
solution to approximating all lattice problems to within linear
factors. A general polynomial-time algorithm that decodes all
MIMO signals under the conditions given in this paper, would,
however lead to a solution to approximating lattice problem,
and this is unlikely.
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